The adoption of new medical technologies in Russian public hospitals is an important part of healthcare modernization and thus is a subject for public finance and regulation. Here we examine the decision-making process on adoption of new technologies in Russian hospitals, and the institutional environment in which they are made. We find that public hospitals operate within a strategic-institutional model of decision making and tend to adopt technologies that bring indirect benefits to their heads/physicians. Unlike Western clinics, the interests of Russian hospital heads and physicians are driven by the possibilities to obtain income from a part of hospital activities: the provision of chargeable medical services to the population, as well as receiving informal payments from patients. The specifically Russian feature of the decisionmaking process is that hospitals are strongly dependent on health authorities' decisions about new equipment acquisition. The inefficiency problems arise from the contradiction between hospitals' and authorities' financial motivation for acquiring new technologies: hospitals tend to adopt technologies that bring benefits to their heads/physicians and minimize maintenance and servicing costs, while authorities' main concern is initial cost of technology. The main reason for inefficiency of medical technology adoption arises from centralization of procurement of medical equipment for hospitals that creates the preconditions for rent-seeking behaviour of persons making such decisions.
Introduction
There are the strong arguments that new technologies have been responsible for rapid medical spending growth and associated budgetary pressures in last decades (Funch, 1986; Newhouse, 1992; Gelinjns & Rosenberg, 1994; Cutler & McClellan, 2001) . The pace of innovation in medicine has escalated; technological advances are extending lives, but driving up costs of health care (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011) . This makes it imperative that the diffusion of new technologies in the health care systems becomes more efficient. The adoption of new medical technologies is a complex process with many actors making it difficult for public regulation. Hence, this process often generates losses in efficiency associated with excess, or vice versa, insufficient acquisition of new technologies, inadequate choice (in terms of economic and clinical parameters) of medical equipment, and its poor use, etc. All of these problems may be seen in countries with different levels of economic development, but in Russia the problem of ineffective adoption of new medical technologies is particularly acute. Spending on health care in Russia is growing steadily: public expenditure on health grew by 1.75 times in real terms from 2001 (Shishkin, 2013 . The National Project "Health", implemented from 2006 4 , and the regional programs of health care modernization started in 2011-2013 5 have included massive public investment in new equipment for medical institutions. But there is a lot of evidence of inefficient use of these funds. For example, considerable violations were committed in the purchase of CT scanners for public facilities. Typically, purchases were made at prices from two to three times higher than the manufacturer's price (The President of Russia, 2010) . Government procurement of new equipment under the National Project "Health" was not aligned in many cases with the needs of medical institutions, and with their ability to make effective use of the new complex equipment. By the end of 2007 more than 7% of medical equipment (by entities, and more than 5% by cost) purchased during first two years of implementation of the Project were not used in medical facilities due to absence of appropriate specialists, lack of expendables, inability to prepare premises and facilities properly, etc (Urgel, Nikonov, 2007) . According to estimates of the International providers of medical equipment Association (IMEDA), between 30-40% of high-tech medical equipment purchased for federal programs is underused or even not used at all (HSE, RANEPA, 2013) . Following a slow expansion of economic activity in 2013, 4 The funding of the Project from the federal budget added 10 percent to public healthcare funds (Shishkin, 2013) 5 The public funding of the programs was 14 percent from public funding of health care in 2011 (Golikova, 2012 .
the Russian government has toughened budget policy in all social sectors including healthcare.
Under the new circumstances, a policy challenge for efficient allocation of public health expenditures provides an opportunity for reflection and research on the causes of inefficiency in medical technology diffusion in the Russian healthcare system. Our main hypothesis is that the key reason for inefficiency is the way the decision-making process on medical technology adoption is regulated.
We focus on hospitals and do not consider polyclinics in this study because the former are the main recipients of public investments in new medical equipment. Using primary data based on in-depth interviews collected in Kaluga region and St. Petersburg, we find answers to the following questions: Who are the prominent actors involved in the decision-making process?
What is their motivation for new technologies uptake? How is the decision-making process organized on the adoption of new technologies in Russian health care facilities? Does it differ from that in other countries (Western and BRICS)?
Although these questions have been discussed in a number of economic studies, this paper will be among the first to shed light on the decision making process on technology adoption in Russian public hospitals.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant background literature as it pertains to technology adoption. Section 3 briefly describes the Russian hospital system in the light of questions to be explored in this paper. Section 4 outlines the methodological approach and data. In the results section (5) we analyse the main pillars affecting the decisionmaking process before section 6 concludes.
Background and related literature
Policymakers and researchers have long been interested in the process of medical technology adoption and acquisition. A number of excellent reviews and meta-analyses develop different classifications of theories, describing diffusion of innovations in healthcare (e.g. Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Grol et al., 2007; Rye and Kimberly, 2007) . According to the research literature, a broad range of factors may affect the new medical technology adoption.
Organizational attributes are identified as one of the main pillars together with environmental influence, connectedness and innovation characteristics (Rye and Kimberly, 2007) . Although some authors (Grol et al., 2007) give theories that focus on individuals and social interaction in separate groups, following Rye and Kimberly (2007) we consider organizational strategy, individuals and groups within an organizational context.
Recent papers that study actors, their beliefs and interests, as well as power distribution in organizations, often go back to Greer's (1985) decision systems concept (Lamboioij, Hummel, 2013; Silva, Viana, 2011; Tepletsky et al., 1995) . Greer (1985) identifies three different rationales motivating adoption of new technologies in hospitals: (i) economic efficiency rationale, (ii) indirect benefits rationale, and (iii) clinical efficiency rationale. Even where these rationales may appear to contradict each other, existing research (Tepletsky et al., 1995; Greenberg et al., 2005) tends to show the ways in which they are complementary.
Economic efficiency rationale
The view from economic efficiency is that hospitals are motivated by marginal returns on investments and so acquire new technology only if it is economically efficient to do so. This means that hospitals evaluate the demand for new medical services, calculate the net present value of costs and revenues associated with technology adoption, apply a cost-benefit analysis, carefully analyze the alternatives (the 'opportunity cost') and adopt the new technology if the marginal benefits of doing so dictate accordingly.
In this spirit, Feldstein (1979) describes the profit-maximizing hospital, and Anderson and Steinberg (1994) develop a price competition model. These models correspond to Greer's (1985) fiscal-managerial decision system, in which key decision-makers include chief executives and fiscal officers. Under this decision system, hospitals often introduce technology assessment and acquisition protocols in an attempt to standardize the decision-making process. Greer cites rationality, predictability, financial viability, and profitability among the main values dictating hospital actions within this fiscal-managerial decision system. While private hospitals are traditionally seen as fiscally oriented, some authors suggest that public and not-for-profit companies can also act as if they aimed to maximize profits in the 'economic efficiency' sense described above (Danzon, 1982) .
Indirect benefits rationale
The second view contends that hospitals adopt new capital-intensive medical technologies in order to enhance associated but indirect benefits. These can include improving the hospital's image and so helping to attract well-known physicians as well as new patients. Within this understanding, one strand of literature argues that hospitals tend to maximize their sales, not profits (Finkler, 1983) . Specifically, according to Finkler, not-for-profit hospitals want to increase their capacity because chief executives' benefits depend on the hospital's sales and volume of services. While demand for each specific medical service is limited, hospitals face incentives to introduce new medical technologies in order to increase the total number of patient visits and services delivered.
The other explanation, corresponding to Lee's (1971) theory of demonstrative behaviour, is that hospitals acquire new technology (no matter how costly) in order to signal that they are technological leaders. More specifically, hospitals invest in technically advanced equipment because they believe patients would associate this investment with better quality of medical care (Duncan, et al., 1995) . In addition, new technologies can help hospitals compete for physician loyalty (Coile, 1990; Renshaw, et al., 1990) . Some authors (Luft et al., 1986) even view technology as a form of non-price competition for patients and physicians, and show that in more competitive markets, hospitals tend to overinvest in technology. Similarly, Pauly and Redisch (1973) claim that not-for-profit hospitals operate as a physician's cooperative maximizing their earnings (distinct from profits). The physicians thus want to offer the latest tools so they can provide patients with the most current medical treatment and increase sales.
All these perspectives, emphasizing the indirect benefits of new technology adoption, correspond to Greer's (1985) strategic-institutional decision system. Strategic planning is often managed with the use of forecasting, SWOT analysis, alternative scenarios development and other managerial tools making governing boards and chief executives key decision-makers.
Following this strategy, executive bodies work on the positive image of a hospital, carefully formulating and promoting the hospital's 'mission', and targeting the hospital's position in the "market" by signalling to the desired patient groups. According to this view, areas targeted as strategically important are financed no matter how costly it will be to adopt new technology and convey the desired image. Financial and managerial calculations inform, but may be secondary to, strategic planning to the extent that financial reasoning can be ignored in favour of developing the hospital's image.
Clinical efficiency rationale
The third rationale stresses clinical efficiency. The basic hypothesis underlying this perspective is that physicians act as agents on behalf of their patients -they decide to adopt new technologies based solely on treatment considerations. However, budget constraints are an important limiting factor. The theoretical basis for this perspective is discussed by Feldstein (1971) in the patients' utility maximization model. The physician's desire to acquire the latest and most comprehensive technologies is explained by the fact that he focuses on the medical needs of his private patients, without considering the needs of the hospital's other patients.
These decisions result in inappropriate adoptions and even equipment duplication. The professional dominance theory explains that inefficient acquisition and misuse of technologies could be due to the physicians' ability to influence other hospital workers by effectively controlling the production function (Pauly and Redisch, 1973; Greer, 1984) . Greer (1985) Greer's empirical analysis, exploring these various motives in the US, failed to reveal a dominant hospital decision system. Greer thus concluded that the rationales underpinning the decision-making process are complex and depend on many factors, including the cost and the type of the technology (incremental or radical). A number of subsequent studies adopted Greer's criteria to determine country-specific dominant strategies: prominent decision-makers, motivation for technology adoption, information gathering and utilization, decision processes, etc. Thus, Rakich et al. (1992) showed that hospital management and the governing board have more influence in the decision process than physicians, implying more frequent use of costbenefit analysis and strategic planning. Friedman and Jorgenson (1994) suggest that the decisionmaking process is a function of physician influence and cost-benefit trade-offs. Teplensky et al. (1995) used econometric tools to study three motivations (profit maximization, technological pre-eminence, and clinical excellence) and organizational strategies to explain MRI adoption in the USA. They used a survey of 507 hospitals to demonstrate that factors attributed to technological pre-eminence were most important in driving acquisition, and explained more of the variance than clinical excellence or profit maximization. However, they also found evidence to support the influence of all three motivations (although less important than technological pre-eminence motivation). Greenberg et al. (2005) examined relevant considerations in Israeli hospitals using a questionnaire for hospital executives. While decisionmaking responsibility varied among technologies, they suggest that decisions were frequently made within a medical-individualistic decision system. The medical director was a key decisionmaker for or against technology adoption and clinical efficiency (medical efficacy, costeffectiveness, complication rates and side effects) was an important criterion. Silva and Vianna (2011) using a case-study strategy to investigate the process of CT scans diffusion in Brazil found that the adoption of CT was mainly determined by administrators of private hospitals, who were influenced by physicians and sales representatives. Expected profitability and patient needs were relevant rationales for decision-making, but were not the major determinants for acquiring new medical devices. Instead, the institutional strategy of each health care organization based on technological leadership was revealed as the strongest determinant for adoption of CT scanners.
It is clear from this brief review of the literature that just as with the US, Israel and Brazil, Greer's description of decision systems offers a useful framework for considering technology adoption in the Russian context. Before describing how we implement this analysis, we will first provide a brief overview of the Russian hospital sector.
Russian Hospital Sector
Russian healthcare system inherited a wide network of public hospitals from the USSR.
Although a limited number of medical facilities were closed before 2010, about 6,000 public hospitals (94% of total) are still functioning all over the country (Rosstat, 2011) . The private hospital sector is very weak forming only 2% of all Russian hospitals. The other 4% are formed by quasi-public hospitals that belong to different public agencies (ministries, administrations etc.) or corporations with public shares (Gazprom, Russian Railways, etc).
Historically, the Russian hospital sector has consisted mainly of public hospitals with a prevalence of those with local status ( fig. 1 ). Depending of its status, each public hospital is subordinated to some healthcare authority: federal, regional, or local. Traditionally, federal hospitals are better equipped than regional and local; however, this is not always the case as a number of better-developed regions now have the capacity to invest in medical facilities. In the late Soviet period, healthcare was not a priority, resulting in underinvestment. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, public funds available for health care have been severely restricted even compared to the Soviet period. In the 1990s, government expenditures for health care declined by one-third (Shishkin, 2013) . Some secondary and rural facilities were closed, but instead of further reducing the network, the government spread scarce public funds over the existing medical facilities. Funds from taxes and Compulsory Health Insurance (CHI) 6 were insufficient to cover the necessary expenses of public hospitals and to provide guaranteed medical services to the citizens. For many years different types of hospital expenses were financed partly or not financed at all, forcing hospitals to introduce more charged services and shift the economic burden to patients.
Although the Russian Constitution declares healthcare and medical assistance free of charge a citizen's right 7 , there is a growing body of evidence to show that a large proportion of private expenditures on healthcare in Russia reflects the out-of-pocket payments for formal and informal charges in health facilities (Gaal P. et al., 2010; Shishkin, 2003) . The payments made formally at the cash desk to public hospitals are often payments for extra comfort or for avoiding a wait in the queue, but also for medical services that, according to the Constitution, should be free of charge for Russian citizens. It is important to note that rough estimates based on official data demonstrate that private health insurance is responsible for only 3-5% of total healthcare financing.
New equipment and devices can be purchased from budget resources (state, regional, local) or from hospitals' chargeable services (mainly for inexpensive devices). In previous years, the CHI funds were sometimes used to buy equipment, but this was never widely adopted.
Medical services delivered to patients are usually reimbursed either from the budget or from the CHI funds. However, the majority of tariffs for medical services are very low. Besides, patients may pay hospitals officially out of pocket (OoP) or through private health insurance. At the moment, private insurance is not very popular -only 5% of the population has it. Instead, patients often pay their physicians informally.
Data and Methods
Hence, for analysing technology adoption in Russian hospitals, the main challenge of the present study was to identify common features in the decision-making processes of Russian public hospitals in acquiring new technologies and to reveal any dominant system, if one exists.
To obtain data for similar tasks, Teplensky et al. (1995) used a survey with a formalized questionnaire and econometric tools, while Silva and Vianna (2011) used in-depth semistructured interviews. We preferred the same way to any type of survey because decisions about medical technology adoption in Russian public hospitals are not overt, health technology assessment is not used, and priority-setting processes are very unclear. Under these circumstances anonymous in-depth interviews were the most appropriate tool to shed light on the process of new medical technologies adoption. For the same reasons, we preferred semistructured to structured interviews to allow the interviews to give us new information instead of simply verifying our own ideas.
As a first step, to select our sample, we chose two quite distinct geographical locations for analysis -the Kaluga region and Saint-Petersburg city. Saint Petersburg is the second-largest city in Russia and an important medical centre, with 111 public hospitals located in the city, while the Kaluga region has 48 hospitals located in different towns, including Kaluga-city (the capital of the region). (Rosstat, 2012) .
As a second step, we selected nine hospitals to represent the typical medical institutions operating in Russian regions. The hospitals included in this study varied by status (local, regional, central), clinical specialty (general, cardiac, paediatric, emergency) and size.
The study was based on 19 personal interviews in the two chosen regions. Calling on
Greer's framework of decision systems (1985) we conducted interviews with nine public hospital executives (they all have medical backgrounds and most of them continue clinical practice as physicians) and seven heads of medical divisions. Similar to Silva and Viana (2011) and Lambooij and Hummel (2013) , we interviewed three regional authority heads. We needed to interview regional authority heads because hospitals strongly depend on public policy to finance, purchase, and regulate new technologies. All interviews were conducted in June 2009.
We have developed two different guides based on Greer's framework of decision systems (1985) -one for hospital executives and heads of medical divisions (Annex 1) and the other for regional healthcare authority heads (Annex 2). In these guides, we have prepared a number of themes and questions to be discussed.
Following the guide we asked hospital executives and heads of medical divisions to respond to questions about information sources, motivations to adopt technology, assessment criteria, factors influencing decision-making, the decision process, and prominent actors. We asked authority heads about the new medical technologies adoption process, priority setting and assessment of new technologies use. In addition, all respondents were asked to describe a recent new technology acquired at their hospitals and discuss any problems that arose from that acquisition. ("New" technologies included both recent tools, but also well-known technologies and devices if they were described as "new" by the particular interviewee -even if they were widely used abroad or in other Russian hospitals.)
All interviews were conducted face-to-face at the interviewees' worksites. Each lasted about one hour. The interviews were recorded and then transcribed.
After all interviews were taken and transcribed, we studied the transcripts to identify common problems and dominant strategies of new medical technologies adoption. We also examined regional specific features that affected the hospital decision-making process. We compared the interpretation of the main drawbacks in medical technologies acquisition given by authority heads and hospitals executives to summarize main causes of inefficiency in the medical technology adoption process.
Decision-making process
This section reports our main findings based on the analysis of interviews. We start with the identification of the main actors and the role they play in the decision-making process. After that, we identify what sources of information hospitals use to select new medical technologies and describe how their assessment is organized. Then we discuss the three rationales explained in section 2 (economic efficiency, indirect benefits, and clinical efficiency) and the main criteria for technologies adoption.
Prominent actors involved in decision-making
The decision-making process in Russian hospitals usually involves a number of participants. These are (a) healthcare authorities (federal, regional, and local), (b) hospital executives, (c) chiefs of medical divisions (senior physicians), and (d) staff physicians. Since each group has different incentives and motivations, the technology acquisition process is highly political and variable, with all actors vying for influence over technology adoption.
(a) Regional healthcare authorities are the main actors in the decision-making process in the regions because they determine which hospital(s) to include in the federal and regional programs. Most local authorities depend on regional budget subsidies, and are not able to make investment decisions themselves. (c) Chiefs of medical divisions (senior physicians) concentrate on the needs of their own divisions, and thus try to persuade hospital executives to invest in technologies needed for their practice. As all hospital executives have a medical background and sometimes maintain a medical practice, they are usually more aware of technologies used in their specialty. Therefore, they must rely on senior physicians' opinions to decide about technologies used in other fields.
They agreed that priority is usually given to chiefs who are ready and capable to develop their divisions and who have enough energy and talent to acquire new technologies. 
Decision-making procedure
Technology acquisition may be initiated either (a) by an authority (federal or regional) or (b) by a hospital.
(a) If it is initiated "from above," then the equipment usually is delivered within a federal or a regional program. Authorities are supposed to aggregate hospitals' requests and take hospitals' preferences into consideration. However, hospital executives in both regions described dozens of situations in which they were forced to adopt equipment they did not need.
Quite often they received equipment and devices that were incompatible because the various producers used different technical standards. Often they received only the very basic versions of equipment, so they could not deliver all of the services needed. Sometimes hospitals were forced to take the equipment that they cannot use because they lacked the appropriate specialists or encountered technological gaps or infrastructure problems. To illustrate this situation, an executive in a Kaluga regional hospital described what ambulances received within the national "Health" project. These new vehicles were equipped with the latest features, but they could not handle the rough rural roads in the region. As a result, the hospitals had to curtail the use of these vehicles and go back to their original ambulances instead. The respondents noted that when they receive equipment "from above," they value it as a "gift", even though these presents are often useless. The hospital is obliged to decide simply "to take it or leave it"; it cannot change the type of equipment received or apply for another producer/specification.
(b) If a hospital is going to initiate a technology acquisition, the decision-making process has two steps. First, a hospital itself decides what technologies it needs to adopt. There are two primary decision-makers: Senior physicians advise, and medical directors (executives) have the final say. Other specialists are occasionally invited to the discussion if their opinion is needed.
There are no standard procedures, and no objective measures or quality comparisons or costbenefit analyses, formal or informal, making the decision-making process very vague.
Second, when a hospital has set its priorities, it has to decide who will finance the technology adoption and organize tenders. Usually the response depends on the price of equipment. Both regions have special rules for costly equipment acquisition. For example, in the Kaluga region, all purchases above 2 million roubles (approx. $66,000 USD) must be approved by the deputy governor of the region, no matter who pays. Hence, the second step often starts with negotiations between the hospital and the authority. Typically, the hospital applies to the regional authority for financing and the authority examines the need and ability to satisfy the request. The negotiation with authorities is a complex process, involving bargaining and compromises, unclear and non-transparent decision-making, and informal relations. This is less true in the Kaluga region because overall competition for technologies is less fierce.
Hospital executives mention that they have to prove the need for a new technology acquisition and often struggle to comply with their requests. They also underline the importance of the "human factor" and personal relations with authority leaders.
Neither hospitals nor authorities use health technology assessment procedures in a priority setting; information gathering about particular technologies is poorly organized; authorities often don't estimate hospitals' ability to adopt and use properly new technologies.
If the authority decides to finance the technology, it is usually responsible for tenders. In The executives complained that quite often they received equipment from unwilling producers because authorities considered only price criteria, or they received the right equipment, but with inconvenient warrantee terms.
Motivations and criteria for technology adoption
Respondents from hospitals in both regions were asked to rank the importance of motivations for technology adoption from three possible choices: (1) 
Hospital charge (4) (5)
When a hospital receives new equipment and introduces technologies out of the budget (federal, regional, local), it does not consider the initial costs of the equipment and may request for the most expensive technology (situations 1, 2, 3).
If all the maintenance and servicing costs are fully charged to a budget or CHI fund (situation 1), the hospital evaluates only the benefits associated with the new equipment (i.e., the formal and informal payments received for using this equipment). The hospital doesn't consider post-guarantee servicing and materials prices.
If a hospital bears maintenance and servicing costs (situation 2), it has to take a saving-cost strategy into account. All respondents indicated that this is a very typical situation, causing
problems: "When equipment depreciates (both physically and morally) it needs renovation/repair. And each time we are in trouble -these expenses (for renewal, repair)… they are huge. Nobody thinks about that"; "we can't afford materials and servicing costs -we have to look for cheaper analogues and often it's not good for equipment".
Most equipment received under the National "Health" Project or under special federal programs for cardiology, tuberculosis, etc. do not imply full post-purchasing expenditures coverage. The tariffs for medical services delivered with the use of the new equipment often do not include maintenance costs, forcing hospitals to search for additional sources of financing, usually from chargeable services (situation 3). This finding suggests that contradictions between the hospitals and the authorities responsible for equipment tenders are inevitable: Those who organize tenders are interested in low equipment prices and do not take other considerations into account, while hospitals are likely to acquire technologies that do not need expensive materials and repairs, regardless of the initial price.
When public hospitals acquire new technologies using their own sources, mainly from chargeable services (situation 6), they evaluate benefits and total costs, including technology, materials, maintenance, etc. In less widespread situations 4 and 5 when hospitals purchase new medical devices for their own account and then use them to deliver free of charge medical services and cover maintenance costs fully or partly from the budget and CHI funds they take into consideration future benefits, initial price of technology and partly maintenance and servicing costs (situation 5). However, incomes from chargeable services are limited, so hospitals cannot buy expensive equipment.
The respondents reported that hospitals (no matter their status and specialization) are usually in situation 1, 2 or 3, making a financial analysis of acquiring technologies useless. In general, hospitals are motivated to introduce technologies that are cheap in maintenance, the other criteria being compatibility with the hospitals' equipment and infrastructure facilities and physician efforts-saving. However, hospitals are not interested in adopting technologies that decrease the period of hospital stays. Furthermore, the respondents reported that since hospitals are reimbursed according to the number of days that a patient stays, they have a financial incentive to maintain less efficient treatments. Most interviewees agreed that in some cases they could discharge their patients earlier but they would lose money: "if we discharge a patient on Indirect benefits. A number of respondents reported image as most important motivation or at least equally important as financial efficiency. They want to be perceived as cutting-edge.
They also said that the desire to have the best possible equipment is common for most physicians and executives. "A lot is driven by prestige," said the head of an authority. "…A desire to have
MRI in a hospital is often just a matter of prestige and has nothing to do with rationality."
Among indirect benefits, four main motivations drive hospitals to acquire new technologies even when there are no economic and financial rationales: (a) attracting patients, (b) attracting physicians, (c) the satisfaction of chief doctors, and (d) privileges for the hospital.
(a) Attracting patients is a dominant motivation. Respondents understand that patients are often aware of new technologies, creating a sort of pressure for physicians. Patients evaluate not only medical equipment and devices but also the design and ergonomic quality of the furniture and the facilities of rooms and wards, motivating hospitals to invest in a comfortable and patientfriendly environment. The focus on environmental investment signals to patients that the hospital cares about all aspects of treatment. This situation is explained by Lee's (1971) 
Discussion
This study has examined how new technologies are adopted by public hospitals in Russia.
We used Greer's three decision-making systems (models) framework to determine a dominant strategy in Russia. policy, motivating for old technologies use and the negotiation process with authorities. We observed only two regional specific features. The first is that technology acquisition is more likely to be driven by competition for desired patient groups in Saint Petersburg, whereas hospitals in the Kaluga region are more likely to be driven by competition for physicians. The second is that in Saint Petersburg regional authorities were more likely to reject hospitals' requests, seeking to avoid equipment duplication.
As our study was limited to 19 interviews, taken in two of the 83 Russian regions, we cannot state that our findings reflect the decision-making process in all Russian hospitals.
Moreover, we assume that some regional variety may exist. However, even with a limited number of interviews, we can deduce that the decision-making process adopted by Russian hospitals and authorities is very inefficient.
We find that the new technologies adoption process has a number of drawbacks that can be observed during each step of decision-making -poor information gathering, ambiguous procedures of technology assessment, authoritarian in-hospital priority setting mechanisms, and informal, non-transparent bargaining between hospitals and authorities.
A specific feature of all Russian public hospitals is that they are strongly dependent on health authorities' decisions about new technologies acquisition. Meanwhile, the criteria for adoption of medical technologies are different for health authorities and hospitals. When making decisions about equipment purchases, the declared priorities of regional health authorities mainly reflect the setting to the population's health care needs and purchasing of the most cost-effective equipment, but usually without taking into account the potential cost of consumables, maintenance, etc.
Although Russian hospital leaders and authority heads do not use advanced managerial tools to make decisions about technology uptake, other criteria that correspond to strategicinstitutional decision system can be easily identified from the interviews. interest to obtain expensive equipment that improves the image of the facility and is expected to be used largely to provide chargeable services. By acquiring new medical technologies, a hospital generates additional revenues by expanding medical services to its patients. The hospital therefore behaves as a cooperative business venture for physicians who benefit financially. This strongly corresponds to Pauly and Redisch (1973) idea of a physician's cooperative, maximizing their earnings. We also find evidence to support Lee's (1971) theory of demonstrative behaviour and idea of non-price competition for physicians and desired patient groups (Coile, 1990; Renshaw, et al., 1990 , Luft et al., 1986 . But unlike Western clinics, the interests of Russian hospital executives and doctors focus on the possibilities to obtain income not from all hospital activities, but only from a part of them: from the provision of chargeable medical services to the population, as well as receiving informal payments from patients.
In cases where the hospitals are buying new equipment themselves at the expense of their revenues from chargeable medical services, their behaviour often corresponds to Greer's fiscalmanagerial model. But, unlike Western clinics, Russian hospital executives consider a narrow range of economic effects (enhancement of services, attraction of additional patients, increase of paid services) and do not take into account such indicators as returns on investment, payback period, price potential, or the size of the market.
However, the main reason for inefficiency of medical technology adoption arises from the central procurement of medical equipment for hospitals that creates the preconditions for rentseeking behaviour of persons responsible for tenders. This evidently leads to replacing efficiency criteria with personal interests. The leading interest in this case is the size of "rolling back" due to the purchase of the equipment that makes cost-effectiveness analysis of new technologies an inappropriate tool for decision-makers. This is the reason the decision-making process does not imply comparison of alternatives by price of equipment and its maintenance costs regarding the expected clinical outcomes. For the same reason, health authorities often inadequately evaluate the needs of different medical services and the possibility of health care facilities to use equipment procured for them effectively. This results in a consistently reproduced situation where equipment is purchased over-capacity, and thus, underused.
To increase the efficiency of decision-making around medical technology adoption, the Russian government needs to shift the responsibilities of the main actors. The right to select and purchase medical equipment should be delegated to hospitals, while health authorities should be in charge of approval of the hospitals' development program. The decision-making process in Russian public hospitals must become more transparent and also take into account the growing body of international research on the relative efficiency of treatments and new technologies.
Decisions should be based on the clinical need for technology, forcing hospitals and authorities to question whether a particular new technology is necessary and whether the resulting increase in clinical efficacy is worth the increased cost. 
